WATER AND SANITATION which don't cost us a red cent. We get water from the community well. We get water from the private aqueduct in the next neighbourhood. We average US$ 50 a year in water expenses and that's as much as we're willing to pay. Why should we pay you more for services we don't really want ? Haven't you ever heard of the free market ? Can't you recognize a fairy tale when you hear one ?"
The handsome foreign company was quite upset to discover that it was facing some competition and it claimed that the beautiful kingdom had not been entirely honest during due diligence. The beautiful kingdom accused the foreign company of bewitching it so that it could see only one kind of private sector participation. But it was too late for either party to withdraw. The enchantment lasted for 30 years and all they could do was renegotiate the contract.
I. WHO REALLY PROVIDES WATER AND SANITATION ?
OF COURSE, ANY resemblance between the events and persons i n the above f airy story and the real world -living or f oreign -i s purely coincidental but it still off ers an i mportant l esson to those of us who have f allen under the spell of priv ate sector participation. Putting our f aith in the large-scale and savvy operators f rom Europe or North A merica, with sophisticated management systems and high-technologi es, can l ead us to ov erlook the small -scale and apparently primitive entre preneurs who are already working underfoot. T hey are private sector too -the " other" private sector -and sometimes, the little f rogs can t urn out to be princes in disguise.
Everybody alive somehow obtains drinking water and disposes of waste waters. In most of the cities of A f rica, A sia and L atin A merica, where less than half of the population is actually served by the util ity networks, someone else prov ides the basic services.
(1) But little academic or institutional work has been done to understand or to develop the capacity of these " alternativ e" providers. There are ( at least) two reasons f or this tendency.
First, state owned water and sanitation utili ti es usually have a monopoly right to serve customers in their jurisdictions. T he formal restrictions on competitive entry into the sector means that entrepreneurs working outside the off icial system are generall y considered illegal, or irregular at best, despite the vi tal service they provi de. Thus, whil e myths abound, littl e concrete inf ormation exi sts about what technically operates outsi de the law.
Second, because they are small and priv ately owned, the " alternative" providers don' t qualif y for loans from donor agencies or banks which traditi onally have f ocused on municipal water companies wi th monopoly rights. W hile some communi ty based p roviders and NGOs have co-existed with the utilities, surviving l argely on grant support, it hasn' t been convenient f or either the utilities, the NGOs or their f inanciers to learn about any other al ternativ e prov iders, except f or their negative connotations.
1. Based on our first study results, we estimate that for Latin American cities 25 per cent of residents depend on independent providers for water and 50 per cent for sanitation. In Africa, the figures rise to 50 per cent for water and 85 per cent for sanitation.
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When we do hear about them they are usually cast as the " bad guys" who charge usurious rates. ( 2) I nterestingly enough, the entrance of l arge-scale private operators into the water and sanitation sector has stirred up i nterest among small -scale priv ate operators. T he introducti on of l arge-scale priv ate operators i nto a sector once considered app ropriate onl y f or the publi c domain has led some to question the long-entrenched ideas about water delivery. A f ter all, if we now admit to the usefulness of some l arge-scale private providers, why not rethink the role of the small-scale provi ders?
A t the same time, many have questioned the v irtue of private sector participation which i mitates the monopol istic structure s of public companies. What, they ask, is really gained by shifting f rom an i nefficient public monopoly to a private monopoly with a publ i c regulator ? Once priv ate sector participation has become accepted in the f orm of large i nternational companies, it is but a logical step to look at local and small-scale private operators and i nvestors.
A s recently as 1996, World Bank sources concluded that " ... the efficiency benefits from involving the private sector are closely linked to competitive pre ssures, rather than deriving simply f ro m 2. In our studies, we have found that private provider charges range from one-tenth those of the public providers (private water systems in Cordoba, Argentina) to eight times those of the public providers (water truckers in Lima, Peru). Cases have been reported where charges range to over 60 times the public charges but, as most public water companies' prices are subsidized, the actual price is paid through other taxes.
Box 1: The Formal and Informal Sectors Join Forces for Water Delivery
In Bangladesh, the water agency has joined forces with private kiosk vendors and with community groups to avoid unaccounted for water. Over the past year, Dhaka has seen the number of privately managed water points in low-income bustee neighbourhoods grow from two to 30. Originally set up through an NGO working under an agreement with the local government engineering department, this programme has left water sales in the hands of either community managed groups or private entrepreneurs who have been accepted by the community. The arrangement favours the water agency which, otherwise, would lose the water to outright theft.
In Abidjan, where the private concession has made a similar agreement with smallscale private operators, SODECI (Société des Eaux de Côte d'Ivoire -the water company of the Ivory Coast) controls the resale price of water at public standpoints through the design of the holding tanks. These tanks can release 50 litres at the turn of a handle, activated by tokens which are sold at a fixed price at kiosks or neighbourhood stores throughout the city. Tank operators, who are selected from local residents by SODECI, sell the water and pay a fixed price for refilling the tank. As the profit margin is fixed, operators can increase their earnings by developing new sales or by offering additional services such as home delivery, but not by raising the price of water. SODECI has some 500 such standpoints throughout the Ivory Coast. Besides the standpoints, however, SODECI has recently noticed that there is a fairly large number of informal water sellers, some actually laying down piping running from their houses to their customers' houses and charging customers for water metered at the seller's house. While this can be an excellent business for SODECI (because water charges increase as the amounts are metered), SODECI has recently begun discussions with the association of informal water sellers of Abidjan, recognizing their importance and charging them at ordinary residential rates in consideration of the service they perform for both consumers and for the utility.
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the presence of a priv ate owner." (3) A long the same lines, Michael Webb of London Economics has recently publi shed a thoughtf ul paper entitled " Competition in water" argui ng that water, like electricity and telephone services, can be prov ided in a competitive business setting.
(4) Webb, like Timothy Irwin of the Worl d Bank who has written in f avour of the " f ree entry" of independent water providers into the sector, tends to l ook at the opportunities off ered by new technologies.
(5) On another level, most countries in the South have enjoyed f ree entry and competiti on in water supply f or many years among the inf ormal or, as we say he re, the independent provi ders of water and sanitation.
II. A NEW INITIATIVE -THE "OTHER" PRIVATE SECTOR
AS PART OF its work on urban envi ronmental sanitation, the UN DP/Water and Sanitation Programme ( WSP) has begun to look more closely at how the non-government and priv ate urban markets work to provide water and sanitation services. A s a f irst step, we reviewed what was available in the f ield, namely studies carried out by colleagues within the WSP and by others, in particular Hydro-Conseil which has worked extensiv ely on independent water prov i ders in Francophone countries under an agreement wi th the French NGO Prog ramme Solidarité Eau. T hese reviews f rom Ethi opia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Mali , Mauritania, Haiti, Yemen and Senegal (6) suggest that the unofficial entrepreneurs i n water and sanitation run a wi de gamut f ro m monopolistic price gougers to community v olunteers on the verge of bankruptcy. T hey point out many interesting f eatures of private operators on a case by case basis.
T hus, the W SP determined to look at a series of cities, f our in L atin A merica (7) and seven in A f rica, ( 8) to determine, among other things, the impact of the independent prov iders on water and sanitation del iv ery and their comparative advantages with respect to the l arge-scale ( city-wide) monopoly enterprises ( both public and private) . A lso, f rom the point of v iew of investors and risk-takers, what stimulates growth and what obstacles block a g rowing and priv ate water and sanitation i ndustry.
T he third phase of activities, as yet to come, will involve f ollowi ng up on recommendations f rom the v arious studies with a view to stimulating a f riendly business environment f or smallscale priv ate water and sanitation providers. WSP will host a f irst regional meeting of i ndependent water and sanitation providers in L atin A merica in the hope of initiating a dialogue between the i ndependent prov iders and gov ernments to i dentif y ways of opening up markets to legiti mate and competitiv e businesses. 3. World Bank (1996) 
III. FINDINGS -WHAT IS THE "OTHER" PRIVATE SECTOR ?
THE VARIETY OF successful water and sanitation enterprises which emerged f rom the reviews and studies conf irms that there is no single model f or provi ding water and sanitation. Rather, the virtue of the " other" private sector lies in its ability to produce appropriate models to fill every circumstance and need. I n di rect contrast to the concessions and their hybrids, def i ned by te rms of ref erence shared and re shared worl dwide, the wide range of f orms which the small-scale providers have evolv ed in response to l ocal conditi ons suggests something close to endemi c speciation. Consider:
Indiv idual f amil ies wi th water and/or sanitation connections who prov ide services to their neighbours, such as those responsible f or 25 per cent of water supply in Bamako. Water poi nts and/or l atrines managed or owned by i ndiv iduals, maki ng up the f astest growing form of water provision in Dhaka; by community groups, providing f or 30 per cent of A ddis A baba' s f amilies; or by NGOs, such as CA MEP in Haiti which hopes to set in place water f or the majority of its lowi ncome residents. Bulk water supply systems ( tank trucks which distribute to cisterns or to individual f amilies) which already supply more than 30 per cent of need in Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City and L i ma, and whose use has recently grown in Turkmeni stan and Uzbeki stan. Priv ately owned and managed publ ic toilets and bath houses; the Indian N GO, Sulabh, has long promoted publi c bath f acili ties at subsi dized rates but, in Bangaldesh and some I ndi an cities, private entre preneurs are putting toil et and bath f aciliti es in key locations and running a brisk business. In Bamako, one community owned l atrine bl ock was purposely bui lt close to a beer hall and charges more to the beer hall owners -f iguring that both their businesses benef it f rom having a toilet close by. Seventeen privately owned public toilet pe rmi ts were issued l ast year i n L ima. In China, public toilets have begun, increasingly, to use cleanliness combined with style and li ght entertainment to draw i n customers. Private competitive water networks which prov ide house connections to water and sanitation, sometimes overlapping wi th competitors such as the aguateros who already cover more than 30 per cent of A sunción, Paraguay wi th some 400 aqueducts run f rom indiv idual ground wells, each system serving between 50 and 2,000 f amilies; or the small bore developer who put together a priv ate sewer system which eventually covered more than 1,000 f amil ies in M alang, Indonesia, bef ore the city hired the developer. Closed water systems, wi th treatment pl ants and piping networks owned by residents, such as the service cooperativ es which cov er a quarter of A rgentina' s urban popul ations, or new housing and i ndustrial developments on the outskirts of L atin A merican cities.
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Truckers wi th priv ate well s prov i ding quality water when public service companies' water is of doubtf ul quality as in Dhaka and, of late, i n Kazakhstan, K yrgyzstan, Turkmeni stan and Uzbeki stan. Sewage remov al services -septic tank emptiers -night soil carriers, responsible f or 95 per cent of the sanitation prov i ded i n A bidj an, i n Dar es Salaam, i n most sub-Saharan cities in A f rica and in most of China as well. Priv ate waste water treatment pl ants, such as SIBEA U i n Cotonou which charges septic tank emptier trucks to receive and treat sul l age, dumping produce i nto the ocean after a secondary treatment.
T he studies suggest f i rmly that the " other" private sector -in all its various f orms -continues to be a major provider. I n the L atin A merican cities, some 25 per cent of the population depend on i ndependent prov iders f or water and about 50 per cent depend on pri v ate sani tation businesses; these percentages appear to rise in secondary cities and towns. I n A f rica, the numbers are higher with at least half of the f amilies living in the capital cities relyi ng on private suppliers of water and about 90 per cent depending on priv ate sanitation businesses. I n the majority of cases studied, the " other" priv ate sector appears to be growing f aster than the publ ic or official prov ider.
A l though there i s a tremendous v ariation in terms of price and quality of service off ered, f rom superb i ntegrated systems, whose charges are even lower than the subsidized tariffs of public uti li ti es, to water di stributors who prov ide water of dubi ous quality at up to eight times the public tariff , the independent entrepreneurs share some i mpressive characteristics in term s of operational efficiencies: they recover their costs f ully and are f inanciall y sustainableor out of business; they have v irtually no unaccounted f or water; they require no publ ic subsidy, borrowing or debt.
A mong the i ndependent prov iders there are clear evolutionary patterns, movi ng towards more eff icient organization and technology as local economies and legal f rameworks permit. A s with other businesses, water and sanitation can be as simpl e or as sophisticated as the business envi ronment permits. W hen the situation allows f or f ree entry and open competition, we f i nd that new technologies develop, prices drop and the quali ty of service improv es as prov iders scramble to compete f or customers. It is notable, f or example, that in the past ten years, the traditional water v endors of Mali, women who carried jars on their heads and sold by the quart or cup, have almost all been di splaced by carters, pushing up to f our oil drums of water in wheelbarrows. Duri ng the same time f rame, the water carters of Ciudad del Este in Paraguay went f rom donkey-drawn carts to trucks and then to underg round pi ping f or house to house connecti ons.
Documenting the eff i ciencies among the small-scale provid-ers has cast serious doubts on some long-entrenched assumptions, such as the economies of l arge-scale water system operators, the natural monopol y of water supply and the noti on that water shoul d be owned, produced and di stributed as a publ ic good. It has also ref uted some stereotypes about the " other" private sector and private entrepreneurs in water and sanitation:
Small -scale water and sanitation enterprises are not simply ma rginal peculiarities with limited replicability. In Guatemala City, ov er 200 independent operators are responsible f or service provision to over half of the population of the metropoli tan a rea. When allowed to f lourish, the small-scale entrepreneurs a re eff icient, competitive and replicable -requiring no subsidies or monopolistic conditions. Water vendors are not dependent on the public sector f or water supply. T he Guatemala study shows that truckers -some 50 a re registered -have their own sources of water or purc hase water f rom other priv ate well s. But the publi c sector may be dependent on priv ate distributors to reach certain neighbourhoods. T hey are not limited to areas where ground water is easily accessibl e ( as i n the Guatemalan and Paraguayan cases) .
A lmost all of the urban population of Sana' a, Yemen and about a quarter of L ima' s depend on small-scale priv ate companies f or their water supply despite di ff iculti es i n f i nding water so urces. T hey are not limi ted to one particular income group. Private servers tend to deliv er water and sanitation predominantly at the upper and l ower-income levels -but the Paraguayan case, al so Sana' a, Dakar and ev e n so me upstart serv e rs i n Barranquill a, Col ombia show that when monopoli stic regulations do not stif le their development, and when the public or principal companies do not underprice their servi ces ( thro ug h gov ernment subsidy mechanisms) , smal l prov i ders reac h middle-income f amilies as well. Private entre preneurs are not bound geographically to particular parts of the city. While there can be col l usion and division of areas, small businesses crop up and compete where needs appear. During six months of the year, aguateros deliver water in trucks to L ima' s most well-to-do neighbourhoods, when rationing hits even the heart of town. T he private prov iders are not simpl y stop-gap businesses. T hey tend to transform their operations and f ind new markets when publ ic services are extended.
IV. FINDINGS -SOME COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
A CLOSER LOOK at the water and sanitation entrepreneurs may well bring about some changes in the traditi onal wisdom. For example, the small-scale entre preneurs f ollow the recommended business practices f ar closer to the letter than the largescale monopolies. T hey are certainly " demand responsive" . They
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c harge market prices, cov ering costs and respecting the willingness to pay. T hey prov ide appropriate solutions in appropri ate places, assume all i nvestment risks and they reach the poor.
a. Customer Service Quality
Working as they do in competitiv e environments, the success of the private operators depends on creating customer loyalty particul arly when the competiti on includes public operators off ering subsidized rates. T heoretically, one would expect a diff erent quality of client treatment depending on who holds the contract and who pays, that i s, when a contract i s wi th the municipality ( as in the case of Col ombi an small enterprises) as opposed to di rectly with clients. However, in the f ormer case, as long as the payments come di rectly from the cli ent, the f ocus appears to be on customer relations; the entre preneur takes pride in knowing customers personall y. I n Paraguay and A rgentina, the aguateros count their rapid response to technical p roblems -same-day service -plus their f lexibility and their readiness to li sten when customers have diff iculty meeting payments among the reasons f or their success. T he independent p roviders at all levels appear to lend themselves to making payments easier and giv ing credit when customers need it; they are better, perhaps, at personal publ i c relations than the l arge companies. Truckers i n L i ma bui ld up communi ty relations by helping out wi th other services -f or example, lending their trucks to bri ng i n el ectri cal equi pment or other i tems. A sunci ón' s aguateros supply water f ree to school s, health centres and c hurches. A nd the water carrier i n Barranquill a f orms personal relations with her clients ( like the one in Uruguay whose well was sealed ov er by the priv ate concession when local f amilies continued to f avour the carrier ov er f ormal connections) .
Box 2: Treating Waste Water for Profit
SIBEAU in Cotonou is one of the very few waste water treatment plants in the whole of Africa. Since 1990, it has treated 240-300 cubic metres of sludge each day, making a big difference to the city environment and to the quality of ocean water. In the vast majority of African cities, however, waste water treatment is a fantasy for the future, far too expensive for any municipal government to entertain. How then can it be that private entrepreneurs have built a waste water treatment plant in one of Africa's poorest cities? And how can it be that they are actually making money from it ? In this case, SIBEAU's owners invested their own funds to build a private treatment plant which receives sullage from septic tank truckers who pay approximately US$ 25 to unload at the plant. SIBEAU gives primary and secondary treatments to the waste water before dumping it into the ocean. The obvious question -why should the trucks line up to pay to dump their contents when they could just as easily find an empty field or dump it into the ocean themselves -has several answers. Perhaps they risk a fine if they are caught dumping illegally; perhaps the costs of carrying their loads out of the city and into the night are too high, thus preventing them from making more profitable pit-emptying rounds. Whichever, SIBEAU recognized the market and makes it easier for trucks to pay and to dump than to do otherwise; so much so that SIBEAU is making a comfortable profit from its charges.
b. Lower Rates
T he priv ate water systems -both the competi tiv e businesses and the closed and cooperativ e aqueducts -sell water at lower prices than the publ ic providers ( most of which subsidize water prices f or low-income sectors) . Prices can be lower still when the priv ate prov i ders are activ ely competing f or markets. In Cordoba, A rgentina, the independent companies sell water f or as little as one-third the price of Aguas Cordobesas, the official company; in Paraguay, the aguateros compete very f avourably de spi t e t he subsi di e s o f f e red by C OR P O SA N A ; and i n Barranquilla, Colombia, several f ull servi ce companies emerg ed but only one, it must be admitted, selli ng below the Triple A ' s rates. A l so, even though they charge l ower rates, the independent prov iders enjoy a higher income-to-expense ratio than the monopoly companies ( a public utility in the case of A sunción and privately owned concessions in Baranqui lla and Cordoba.) T his suggests that the independent providers' operations are mo re eff i cient and more cost-eff ective than the large-scale official companies -a point we re turn to below.
c. Varied Services
T he water entre preneurs have moved i nto the producti on and sale of ice, soda water, f lavoured waters and other related products i n all the cities we studied. Their knowledge of markets ( consumer habits) and their eff icient production systems gi ve them an advantage i n di scovering and developing new products.
d. Capacity to Grow with Demand
T he i ndependent prov iders increase their service delivery as demand g rows, not in response to i njections of outside capital. Publ ic operators and concessions tend to expand servi ces i n spurts ( when loans f rom the World Bank, I FC or private f inanciers are secured) . A t these times, the publi c operators and concessions can driv e the i ndependent operators out of the market -at least f or a while. In between these periods of expansion, however, consumers must wait -someti mes years-f or domestic water servi ces. T he i ndependent operators manage to f ind new customers within days or weeks of their emergence. In L ima and Barranquil l a, the truckers and water carriers know about new settlements well bef ore the municipal planners have detected their existence. Even sophisticated network operators li ke the aguateros try to set up deliv ery systems in advance of population growth. Their ability to stake a f ast claim in a developing a rea giv es them a lead over their competitors.
e. Capacity to Reach the Poor
T he i ndependent prov i ders appear i ncome and class-bli nd when it comes to seeking out customers. T heir poor customers a re clearly willing to pay the prices charged or the prov iders WATER AND SANITATION would be bankrupt. T he f act that they set their prices to cov er their costs gi ves the independent prov iders a tremendous advantage ov er the publi c sector companies which tend to underc harge and, theref ore, cannot aff ord to serve the poorer population groups. By the same token, independent prov iders either c harge nothing f or connections or def er connection costs over time to draw in low-income customers in the hope of securing their business i n the long run. Priv ate concessions, on the other hand, have been stymi ed in their attempts to extend services to poor neighbourhoods because the poor cannot pay f or connecti ons up f ront. ( The experience of Aguas Argentinas i n Buenos A ires i s a case i n point.) While the independent provi ders may cut back on investments when f eeli ng i nsecure about their business f uture, they do not appear to be put off by issues of illegal te nure, customer' s income levels nor by population size when they move into a new territory. T he truckers and water carriers in L ima and Barranquil la are quite unfazed by diff icult terrain and wretched conditions f or deliv ering water in slums.
f. Flexible Technologies
A lso in their f avour, the small -scale entrepreneurs appear to play a special role in introducing innovativ e technologies, market approaches and administrativ e systems. Small -bore sewer systems, f or example, were f irst i ntroduced into Buenos A ire s by IIED-A mérica L atina (9) who were in touch wi th a priv ate ent repreneur f rom Col ombia, and f irst appeared in M alang, Indonesia as the brain chil d of a small-scale entre preneur who had read about them and decided to try them out. While largescale companies tend to be discouraged by the risks and costs implied by new technologies ( and, by implication, of abandoning the use of existing technologies) , small-scale entre preneurs have nothing to lose by trying out something new.
Small-scale entrepreneurs, both by virtue of their size and their consequent ability to get closer to clients, have developed simpler and appropri ate charging mechanisms, f rom off ering their clients credit to charging on a daily basis like the " water women" in Dakar. In Guatemala City, the first system of " paying-as-you-go into your bank" was introduced by a community owned and operated water company -A COVA -serving some 7,500 f amilies. Small-scale entrepreneurs have also devised simple contracts with communities to guarantee service in re turn for exclusivity -a form of mini-concession on a neighbourhood basis.
Transfers of knowledge might actually be simpler at the smallscale entrepreneur level than at the l arge-scale one. T he rapid spread of private standpipe services throughout Bamako began when some women v isited relativ es in the city and asked about the standpipe business. A n NGO which promoted a f ibregl ass latrine f or sale in Dhaka was overcome when cottage i ndustries sprung up copying the model and selli ng it on the streets at a f ractionally higher price -but with f ree i nstall ation. 
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V. WHEN THE "OTHER" PRIVATE SECTOR CAN WORK AT ITS BEST
THE VIRTUE OF the independent priv ate sector i s that i t makes contracts with customers, not with gov ernments, and i t i s at its best when entre preneurs must compete f or cli ents and assume the f ull risks of their own investments. There is clear evidence that prov iders improve their performance when the possi bi li ty exi sts that another provider can wi n over their customers. L ike the public sector companies, the f ormal or off icial private sector makes contracts wi th gov ernment. W hen such providers compete f or concessions, it is not clear that service quality improv es.
A s with its counterpart, quality f rom the " other" priv ate sector depends on an eff icient regul atory system, but one which is based on performance not on technical standards. T he conditions i n Paraguay off er a good example. SENA SA , the health ministry' s water quality division, tests the water f rom the private operators on a regular basis ( at least once every six months when the aguateros pay a commercial tax) . SENA SA also settles di sputes between customers and providers, off ering an office where clients can complain of shut-off s, of poor pre ssure or di scontinuous service. T hus, the aguateros are encouraged to devise the best technological system f or providing services; for exampl e, they are not f orced to conf orm to the same pi pe di ameter, whether serving 50 or 2,000 customers. I n other countries, where regulators set technological standards rather than pe rf ormance standards, there is l ittle encouragement f or experimentation and a clear disincentive to search f or better sol uti ons even though the end product may not be up to standard.
a. Where the Public Sector and Private Sector Maintain Separate Operations
In many ways, the public sector i s the worst off ender in term s of forming consortia with private operators. The publi c sector has to resist the temptation to join f orces with the priv ate providers and -above all -to subsidize the operators. The public sector can off er heal thy competi ti on, as i n Cordo ba or i n A sunción, but mi xed ownership arrangements appear to reduce the incentive f or service growth or improv ement.
b. Where Association, Mentoring and Local Culture Permit Networking and Professional Consciousness
T he success of the aguateros in Paraguay i s due i n large part to their own ability to create a trade association and, bef ore that, to establish a sense of association, albeit inf ormal, and to overcome the very real sense of illegitimacy and guilt which besets i ndependent water providers in other countries. To a similar extent, the cooperative movement i n A rgentina has f lourished because it was encouraged and applauded f rom the ti me of Juan Perón. I t has stagnated, however, as a result of longterm l egislation which sets a tariff structure allowing f or operators to charge operational costs and a 25 per cent prof it margi n.
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T he 25 per cent margin may seem generous, but f or two f actors. Fi rst, wi th inf lation rates that are never less than 10 per cent and which sometimes have been as high as 1,000 per cent in the past f if teen years, the prof i t margin can easily be eclipsed. Second, and perhaps more important, the tariff structure does not allow f or depreciation or f or recovery of investment costs. T hus, any new connections or network expansions must either be paid f or in advance or covered f rom the prof it margin of 25 per cent. T he aguateros of Cordoba are coming to terms wi th the off icial company, Aguas Cordobesas, onl y because they have also f ormed a l ong-standing trade association which can speak f or their mutual i nterests.
c. Where Physical Conditions Permit
It is quite obvious that the availability of good quality gro und water, such as abounds i n Paraguay, spurs the development of the i ndependent priv ate provider. This has also been helped by the f act that the major pipelines were laid bef ore the city' s streets were paved and that they are l ocated on road shoulders where repairs can easily be eff ected. However, the physical conditions do not make the case alone. T here are over 60 wel ls on the outskirts of L ima but not one inside the city because of legal restrictions. A nd in Col ombia, where both surface and gro und water is of good quality, the technologies f or extraction and minit reatment are l acking.
Box 3: Competition Makes for Better Services
The aguateros of Paraguay compete for markets among themselves and also with the public water company, CORPOSANA, and with rural and peri-urban water committees, the juntas de agua. There are few aguateros who do not overlap with at least one other provider who is always ready to extend services farther into the other's territory, as long as there are willing clients. There are several streets in Asunción with as many as four different pipelines, served by as many different aguateros. Of course, the aguateros, the water entrepreneurs, must keep on providing excellent and low-cost services or their clients will move to the next provider. The situation keeps aguateros in close contact with customers. Since businesses tend to be small, losing even one customer is serious for the aguateros. But, interestingly enough, the aguateros wouldn't have it any other way. When they were asked recently by SENASA to join in an upcoming rural water project run by water committees, they agreed but asked that the water committees allow for multiple entry in each jurisdiction. That way, they explained, they could compete with each other for customers and could spend their time working their systems. Otherwise, they would have to go after the politicians and that would mean leaving the systems behind. Many would prefer to avoid the classic concession experience because it tends to imply a contract for the operator who is willing to spend the most money to impress the politicians -which means the wealthiest contractor. "And then," says one aguatero, "they come looking for us to subcontract to anyway." Several aguateros mentioned that they preferred to keep their systems small. Anything over 1,000 connections and they have to rely on middlemen and lose personal contact with the customers, rather flying in the face of economies of scale theories. To increase services, they are looking into adding sewer systems for small groups, rather than extending their aqueducts.
Regulations which prohibit or condition private ownership of i nf rastructure will -obv iously enough -keep independent operators ( i ncludi ng community groups or small-scale providers) f rom getting f inancing or risking their own capital f or laying down piping or f or buying sound technical advice. Too of ten, the laws involving private sector participation have been written with a single f ixed scheme in mi nd. In Peru, the recent law def ining the management and administration of water purports to open the sector to priv ate participation but it actually giv es municipalities and the local utility companies the right to sell water and sanitation servi ces only to another monopoly company, with up to 100 per cent priv ate ownership. A side f rom the f act that f ew private operators or investors are apt to compete wi th, participate i n and/or manage large local water companies, the f ocus on only one kind of private f irm puts a damper on potentially healthy small -scale and entrepreneurial eff orts where competition already exi sts.
VI. TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM FOR WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES
FURTHER STUDY OF the " other" priv ate sector in water and sanitation may challenge traditi onal v iewpoints and bring out new considerations f or sector reform allowing for f ree entry by small prov iders, particularly i n countries in A f rica, A sia and L atin A merica where needs are v aried and single monopoly provi ders are rarely able to satisf y a f ull city population. However eff icient the large-scale monopoly companies have prov ed in the USA and Europe, it is hard to f ind similar examples or replicable experiences in these regions. A single provi der may operate eff iciently in a city where everyone can pay f or -and wants -a standard metered water connection and a sewer hook-up but a range of providers might off er the optimal combination of services when needs and conditi ons di ffer f rom one neighbourhood to another, or indeed f rom one household to another, as is of ten the case i n cities i n the South.
By the same token, the i dea of competing small -scale providers reinf orces the recently broached idea that delivery of water and sanitation services need not be monoli thic in structure; in other words, the same company need not carry out all related f unctions to guarantee optimal eff iciency. A s we have seen, the entre preneurs have mov ed into diff erent parts of the service cycle: some distributing water, some produci ng and reselling it, some simpl y charging and administering the sale f or others.
Finally, recognizing and understanding the role of small-scale p roviders will lead to a rethinking of the usual regulatory mechanisms; f rom a f ocus on price caps, subsidy issues and quali ty control to one of encouraging competition and sharing inf ormation. A dmittedly, this f lies in the f ace of some traditional thinking about water services and of long-entrenched publi c sector poli cies. Rather than l et the customers test their water at the tap and seek out the server who best meets their needs, regulations have historically f ocused on designing a single large-scale
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system which f ocuses on producti on and not on reaching diverse needs or communities. When people can' t afford the costs of the high-standard systems, public policy dictates subsidies f or the minority who do get water to their houses. The rest must still pay the high prices and buy less water as a result.
A pplying subsidies and encouraging official monopolies, f or exampl e, can cause small prov iders to operate on a shoestring or put them out of business altogether. Sometimes, the best intentions of the public sector can have negativ e effects. Eff orts to " organize" small-scale entre preneurs, rather than l etting them compete, could f orce a monopoly onto small-scale entre preneurs and create barriers to entry. Regulations might, instead, ref ocus on those concerns which, originally, led to network water supply systems, f or example, control of water quali ty at the tap and the provision of pre ssure points in case of f ire.
T he parable which introduced this paper all uded to a f amili ar ref rain i n the water sector. In cities of the South, the poor pay for water five, ten, 15, 35 times that which the wealthy households, who are connected to the public aqueduct, pay. While the story generally leaves us, like the shining f oreign knight, gasping at the outrageously high charges levelled by the small-time water sellers, it ought to leave us wondering about what people really pay f or water and sanitation -both to the priv ate entre preneurs and to the publi c aqueduct -and why. T he news f rom Guatemala demonstrates clearly that water truckers' costs go up in di rect relation to the distance they travel and to the number of alternativ e water sources available to the inner-city communities. Where competition i s high, the truckers charge the same as the water company charges i ts unsubsidized customers: about 12 ti mes l ess than the same truckers charge the out-of -town customers who rely on them as a sole source. But no one can match the water company' s subsidized prices. Ev en the water company f i nds i t can' t repeat its own performance. I t serves less than half of the metropol itan area' s popul ation and i s l aggi ng behind the rate of natural i ncrease i n population. I n this case, the best way to help the poor doesn' t seem to be to expand the water company' s coverage and to kill off the water truckers but, rather, to encourage more small -time entre preneurs to enter the market and to compete. Going back to that f airy story then, we close with a moral: Don' t send out the dragon-slayer until you' re sure you' ve found the right dragon. 
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